



## **The Abstract**

### **The Historical Foundations of secularist Trends in contemporary Turkey**

**By: Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Khalil Al-Allaf**

**This paper drives at studying two significant aspects of the reformation in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: The first is to trace back the foundations of secularist trends in the Ottoman Empire highlighting the salient domains and the legal procedures it encompassed down to its branching off with Mustapha Kemal efforts. The second is to tract the policy of kemalism in the field of establishing a novem state according to secularist principles which exclude religious impact from politics.**

**However, the paper reached that a consequence which made Mustapha Kemal Ataturk `successors realize that was impossible to ignore a rather significant reality that religion is one of the most political and Social forces influencing Turkish Society.**





## The Historical Origins of Secularism in Contemporary Turkey

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### Introduction

Secularist trends in the Modern Turkish State that founded by Mustapha Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) after the First World War were by no means a novel phenomenon. They are rather an outstanding ring in a long series of reformations launched in Ottoman Empire since the first half of the eighteenth century driving at the modernization of Turkish society according to the western way of life while leaving basic norms of Islamic jurisdiction intact <sup>(1)</sup>.

Accordingly it becomes all-too-evident that Mustapha Kemal had derived from and walked on the footsteps of a movement which goes back to Ottoman Sultans some two centuries ago. Thus, Mustapha Kemal's achievements must be viewed in connection with

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previous reformation measures adopted by the Ottoman authorities, namely, by Sultan Ahmad III (1703-1730) and his successors to affect changes in the administration, economy, and social life of the Ottoman peoples and, in the same time, keep up the integrity of the Ottoman State<sup>(2)</sup>.

This paper is an attempt to study two significant aspects of the reformation in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: The first is to trace back the foundations of secularist trends in the Ottoman Empire highlighting the salient domains and the legal procedures it encompassed down to its branching off with Mustapha Kemal efforts. The second is to trace the policy of kemalism in the field of establishing a modern nationalistic state according to secularist principles which exclude religious impact from politics<sup>(3)</sup>.

### **The Nature of the Ottoman State**

To delineate the dimensions of secularist trends which began to emerge in the Ottoman Empire with the advent of the eighteenth century, and which obviously ran counter to the traditional directives of Islam, it is indispensable to scan the nature of the Ottoman State and see whether it was an Islamic state par excellence? It is a historical fact that religious factor was at work in the establishment of the Ottoman State at the end of the thirteenth century. That is because it was then one of the





several princedoms established on the borderlines with Byzantium nourishing the idea of holy war for the purpose of spreading Islam <sup>(4)</sup>.

Early Ottomans were indeed convinced that they were people of a message and were accordingly bound to extend the borders of Islamic domain "Dar'ul- Islam", and that their state was a legitimate continuation of Muslim caliphate with its capital at Baghdad which the Mongols overthrew in 1258 A.D. <sup>(5)</sup>.

In spite of the foodlessness of the theory of the caliphate transfer from the last Abbasid caliph to Selim I(1512-1520), and the fact that such a theory is historically baseless; Ottoman Sultans in the age of decadence and military defeats before the powers of the Christian West, began to feel interested in Islam. So they adopted the title of Muslim caliphs. It is also well -worth pointing out that regardless of the fact the Ottoman Sultan was combining both temporal and religious powers, the concept of the independent state even in the period of decline after the sixteenth century, did not lose its legitimate overtones.

Since the seventeenth century, however, Ottoman sultans began to lose their charismatic halo which had gradually moved from scepter to state. It was then very much possible to dethrone or even kill the sultan by the name of the state without the least consequences <sup>(6)</sup>. Thus





Ottoman State was by no means a pure Islamic state that is a state with a religiously based and designed regime.

Facts proved that the Islamic shape of the Ottoman Empire was not but an outward figurehead it casually adopted under pressure coming out from encounter with the west since the advent of the eighteenth century. Metin Heber <sup>(7)</sup> goes further to add that Turkish "authority used to assign to religion a definite place in Turkish society". This place, he continues, was by no means marginal. Also, Ottoman Sultans used to resort to Sultanic norms in promulgation of laws and regulations more than they did to Islamic jurisdiction. State was founded in the sultanic milieu as an instrument for tackling down to earth concerns.

Moreover, the Islamic institution headed by Sheikh'ul-Islam was, together with its officials, a satellite to the sultan. Contrary to their shiite peers in the neighboring Safawi State in Persia, the Ulama in the Ottoman State relished co-operation with the political authority as the only means with which they could guarantee good-living and prestige, let alone the limited impact they would obtain over the secularist administration. Examples in Ottoman history on verdicts given by religious muftis (Sheikhs of Islam) to the effect of legitimizing mundane practices of the sultans are beyond count <sup>(8)</sup>.



Heber concludes that the ruling Ottoman authorities never hesitated in affecting "secularist" changes in state organs based on borrowing western modes and thoughts alien to Muslim traditions. He attributed that to Ottoman leading mentality during the first decades of the eighteenth century A.D., when European intellectual impact over flooded Europe and reached grassroots in the Ottoman state. Thus it was a natural outcome to break free from the restrictions of Muslim jurisdiction.

It seems likely that the Sunni Hanafi doctrine which stresses analogy and reason had played a significant role in piloting Turkey towards modernization and promulgation of contemporary legal system according to Western prototype. This shift became urgent in the light of outdated institutions that do not meet modern trends of development <sup>(9)</sup>.

Some sultans, politicians, and the intelligentsia recognized the necessity of borrowing European patterns as a panacea that would bring to life the Ottoman state and halt its galloping decline <sup>(10)</sup>. However, this understanding contradicts the convention of another group who maintains that decline was not due to Islam.

On the contrary, it was due to the loss of Islam and to the increasing relinquishment of the forefathers' norms and ethos. They blamed the Ulama for not taking the lead in enlighten and guiding the sultans to the true path. They





also complained that offices were being handed out to ignorants through nepotism and swindling <sup>(11)</sup>. Yet, it seems that the scales was for the first group who voted for Western adaptation and it was therefore the reformation in the Ottoman Empire followed the line of borrowing from Europe its modern systems and apply them to Ottomon life while leaving Islamic jurisdiction untouched <sup>(12)</sup>.

Reformation movement in the Ottoman Empire was largely an internal concern. Growing Middle Class in Istanbul, regardless of the European pressure on the Ottomans to catch up with reformation and deal with equity with Muslim and non-Muslim subjects within its domain, had supported every step towards the liberation of the country from feudal lords and religious zealots. It did not hesitate in giving out all possible assistance to the central government in its effort to establish a new administration and modern civil code.

The government, in turn, welcomed this co-operation for demolishing status quo would up lift its power and sustain its control. Thus Turkey walked in the footsteps of Europe itself where the rising Middle Class sided with the ruling monarchs to undermine feudal order and set up a powerful government during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries <sup>(13)</sup>.



### Secularist Trends in the Ottoman State

Niyāzi Bērkes pinpoints the year 1718 A.D., as a starting-point for the adoption of secularist thought in the Ottoman Empire <sup>(14)</sup>. Flickering of secularist ideas began to glimmer in the Ottoman horizon. A French officer, named “De Richefort” put up a project proposal to the sublime porte to the effect of introducing aspects of European progress into the Ottoman Empire. The proposal entails the setting-up of a team of specialized engineers to be directly-related to the sublime porte.

Khalid Ziyada <sup>(15)</sup> goes further to state that sultan Ahmad III (1703-1730A D.) had adopted that project and was particularly careful to maintain contacts with the European capitals and imitate their social life and architecture <sup>(16)</sup>. This trend had culminated in the introduction into Istanbul the first press in 1728 but only after assiduous efforts by an Ottoman citizen, named Ibrahim Mutfariqa to persuade sheikhu'l- Islam and Ottoman officials of its harmlessness <sup>(17)</sup>.

It is well-worth pointing out in this connection that the first book authored by Ibrahim Mutfarriqa in 1731 bore the title “The Origins of Government in the Constitution of Nations”; which refers to the prevailing secularism in Europe and how it drives at the separation of religion from state. He says:





"Christian nations have today disposed of holy rites to manage the state affairs. That is to say there is no God-promulgated law which they feel religiously bound to abide by whether in promulgation of new laws or decisions relating to the administration of the state. They only abide by those laws and decrees issued from the light of their reason" <sup>(18)</sup>.

Sultan Mahmud I (1730-1754) continued his father's reforms. During his reign significant borrowings from Europe were made. The French De Bonval (1675-1747) had submitted a project for the establishment of an Engineering School. Also during his reign the distinctive features of Ottoman enlightened elite with knowledge of European tongues and ambition to modernize their state began to surface.

Among those was the Minister Raghıb Pasa who established a public library and ordered the translation of some European sources into Turkish <sup>(19)</sup> during the reign of Ottoman III (1754-1757). As for Sultan Mustapha III (1767-1773), he ordered the reorganization of marine and artillery corps according to European techniques and weapons depending on supervision of European experts and officers headed by the French Barun Tott <sup>(20)</sup>.

With the successive victories of the French Revolution in Europe and the French onslaught against Egypt in 1798 which was an Ottoman province then, the



drift towards reformation received a new momentum. The very superiority of the French army confirmed the necessity of reformation. It is also noticeable that the principles raised by the French revolutionaries stressed on Freedom, Brotherhood of man, and Equality had stirred the thought of Ottoman reformists. Thought acculturation was achieved by both French military missions sent to Istanbul to modernize the Ottoman armed forces, and through diplomatic representation whether European resident in Istanbul or Ottoman resident in European capitals and particularly in Paris <sup>(21)</sup>.

Selim III (1789-1807) was the first Ottoman sultan to bear the title of Reformist in the pre- Tanzimat period (1834-1876). That is because Selim III had initiated the first comprehensive project of reformation according to the European model. Among his outstanding reforms were the abolishing of Janissaries and the formation of a new army, the founding of a monetary fund to provide for modern institution and technical institutes, and the maintenance of permanent Ottoman embassies abroad.

However, these reforms did not pass unchallenged for Ulama objected to the founding of a new army under the pretext that such army was a replica of a faithless counterpart and was therefore, a heretical innovation. The Janissaries supported the Ulama and declared their disobedience in a mutiny culminating in the dethroning of



the sultan in May 1807 A.D., and bringing Mustapha IV (1807-1808) in his place. A few months later a counter-revolution erupted when supporters of the new order overthrew Mustapha IV and brought to the throne prince Mohmud II (1808-1839) <sup>(22)</sup>.

Sultan Mahmud II was unanimously considered as the promulgator of a most extensive reformation programme in the Ottoman Empire <sup>(23)</sup>. Among the outstanding provisions of his reformation programme were the abolishment of traditional military units known as Janissaries in 1826, reinstitution of direct state control of provinces, modernization of the educational system through the establishment of modern official schools supervised by the state and the setting up of a supreme council for legislation and assigning to this council the task of reviewing laws.

This council, however, was to shoot up the state consultative council in 1868. Sultan Mahmud II pursued reforms assiduously. He issued a penal code, introduced European uniform and European order to the Ottoman army, established a house for translating, a council of ministers after the European example to reinforce administrative competence, reopened Ottoman embassies abroad, dispatched 100 scholarship students to Europe <sup>(24)</sup>, established an official gazette entitled "Taquim Waqa'ie" (Calendar of events) whose first issue

was in November 1831; thus, initiating modern journalism in the Ottoman Empire<sup>(25)</sup>. And, Finally, Sultan Mahmud II had cancelled out both Bektashi and Mavlawi Sufi orders for their connection with the Janissaries. In doing so Sultan Mahmud II had excluded both religious figures and Sufi Sheikhs from the military legislative and educational institutions. Thus he had created a suitable atmosphere for the continuation of change in Ottoman society and modernizing it according to secularist norms and principles<sup>(26)</sup>.

Most importantly, Sultan Mahmud was deeply concerned with issuing an official declaration confirming the principle of Human Rights and the right to equality among all subjects of the Ottoman state regardless of their religious faith: He says to this effect:

"I proclaim, from now on, that Muslims are Muslims in their mosques only, and Christians are Christians in their churches, and Jews are Jews in their temples, but, outside these places, they are all equal and enjoy the same political rights." <sup>(27)</sup>

In his comment on this declaration, Geoffrey Lewis<sup>(28)</sup> says that this declaration projects Sultan Mahmud's desire in separating religion from the state for in it he stresses equity among religions and the citizens sharing the same political rights to replace the previous traditional division based on distinguishing two categories of



citizens where there is on one hand Muslim citizens and on the other hand just non-Muslim subjects.

With the coming to helm of Sultan Abdul-Majeed (1839-1861) a new stage of reformation known as Tanzimat had begun. This stage continued until the proclamation of the constitution in 1876<sup>(29)</sup>. On the third of November 1839, the Sublime Porte issued a reformation covenant called "Khat-i Shareef Golkhana" which opens a chapter of reforms. This covenant was reinforced by another reformation charter known as "Khat Shareef Hamayon" on 18<sup>th</sup> Feb., 1856.

These two reformation covenants drove at invigorating administration and forming a society where both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects live on equitable terms besides ameliorating social and economic conditions. In consequence, a new movement to modernize and reorganize laws was initiated and the issue of civil code marked a historic point of departure in 1869-1876. This was ensued by the establishment of civil courts in 1869, which was parallel on the surface religious courts but narrowed in practice the latter's range of jurisdiction<sup>(30)</sup>.

Reformation bills had paid a special attention to education and highlighted its importance by setting up a committee for its scanning and evaluating. This committee had submitted its report in 1846. It did not proposed abolishing religious schools but suggested the





establishment of a new educational system on parity with the religious schools. Then a law for the effect of educational reformation was issued in August 1846, according to which the government took up supervision on education instead of Ulama.

A ministry of education was set up in 1866. This ministry was in charge of establishing new schools that lie beyond the reach of religious Ulama. Those schools were to instruct civil sciences such as arithmetics, geometry, health, geography and history. The instructors were to receive their training independently beyond the reach of Ulama and religious authorities <sup>(31)</sup>.

Although the outcome of these changes in education was not directly felt, their fruit in the long run was great in two respects; first they were correct starting-point since they resulted in coming into existence of an intellectual and ambitious class of people aware of Western cultural values, and second, this shift had wrung educational tools out from the hands of a traditional caste used to influence social life, namely the Ulama, and replaced those tools in the hands of the state which opened a new horizon for generations to develop <sup>(32)</sup>.

As for social aspects, the Ottoman society began to navigate towards modern life. This trend featured in the organization of state buildings and in their provision with new fittings and furniture. Western clothes replaced

together with fez, the Muslim puffed gown and headgear, and notable, nobles and the rich moved from their old shabby houses in old avenues in Istanbul and large Ottoman cities to newly-built houses which mirrored European prototypes. The state, on its part, promulgated laws to the effect of changing the economic and social structure of Ottoman society. Most outstanding among those laws were the law of land and the law of Wilayets<sup>(33)</sup>.

When Sultan Abdul-Aziz ascended (1861-1876), the energy of the Ottoman young generation armed with education reached its outward expression and zenith. Those youth asked for more reformation measures and it was in journalism that new generation found on outlet for their energy. They both criticized the status quo and made public new concepts such as patriotism, independence and love of motherland. So people became aware of these concepts.

The surge had been too powerful towards reformation that a thinker like Diyya Gok Alp did later criticized Ottoman Tanzimat and stated that they were founded on reconciliation formula while he supported a complete severance between religion and politics. He also disparaged the concept of double-harnessing Western and Eastern cultures for there are fundamental conceptual

differences between them. He suggested the complete and all-out adoption of Western way of life <sup>(34)</sup>.

The Tanzimat movement had been culminated in the issue of 1876 constitution. This was the fruit of efforts made by a group of liberal reformists such as Midhat Pasa <sup>(35)</sup>. The constitution which was based on the Belgian counterpart falls in 119 provisions announced in a public celebration staged on 23<sup>rd</sup> November, 1876 <sup>(36)</sup>.

Sultan Abdul-Hamid II (1876-1909) declared that the constitution drives at the accomplishment of civil and political equity among all the Ottomans. The agreement between the constitution and Islamic legitimacy engaged the concern of all reformists at that time that sheikh'ul-Islam told Sultan Abdul-Hamid II the day the constitution declared that it was on parity with the right path of Islam <sup>(38)</sup>.

Provision six of the 1876 constitution states that "Islam is the official religion of the Ottoman state". Also, that everyone has the right to practice the rituals his religion dictates. The constitution states too that Sunnite Sultandom stands for the grand Islamic caliphate and it therefore, belongs to the older son of dynast of Ottoman, and that the appellation Ottoman applies to all subjects of Ottoman State regardless of his religion and nationality, and that education in all schools is to be paced under the state supervision <sup>(39)</sup>.





On the 19<sup>th</sup> March, 1877 Ottoman parliament convened with its two councils and Sultan Abdul-Hamid gave a speech in which he confirmed the necessity of sparing no efforts for the sake of the progress and welfare of the nation. He also praised the Tanzimat. During the session some MPS showed both courage and frankness in airing their opinions and pointing out the problems the country suffers from.

However, sultan Abdul-Hamid could not tolerate such freedom and his despotic disposition gained the upper hand over him so he exploited the Russian declaration of war against Turkey on 24<sup>th</sup> April, 1877, to abrogate the parliament, suspend the constitution<sup>(40)</sup> and adopt the call for Islamic Unity-a slogan for his anti-freedom and counter-democratic policy. The call for Islamic Unity; however was nothing but a political stratagem employed by the sultan to withstand colonial penetration into Ottoman provinces<sup>(41)</sup>.

Despotic rule of Abdul-Hamid II had resulted in the growth of nationalistic consciousness among Turks and other peoples within the Ottoman Empire. Thus the Union and Progress Committee which was an underground revolutionary organization set up in 1889, and was connected to the Freemasons Lodges, succeeded in staging a military coup which enforced Sultan Abdul-Hamid to recover 1876 constitution<sup>(42)</sup>.





However, the Unionists did not waste time in taking the opportunity of the counterrevolution taking place on the 13<sup>th</sup> April, 1909 which called for the rule of Islamic law "Shari'a". They accordingly managed to issue a religious verdict to the effect of uncrowning Sultan Abdul-Hamid II and seating his brother prince Muhamad Rashad with the name of Muhammad V (1909-1918) on the thrown<sup>(43)</sup>.

In the aftermaths of the 13<sup>th</sup> April, 1909 event and the dethroning of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II, the Unionists realized that "Islam" was unquestionably a force to be reckoned with. Therefore they affected certain changes in the restored constitution recovered in 1908. They stated in article 7 that the Sultan is responsible of defending "Shari'a".

They also stated in article 18 of the above constitution that the laws should be grounded on the rules of shari'a. They confirmed, bunked by religious Ulama that it was necessary to compromise between secularist systems and Islamic principles. Sheikku'l-Islam, namely" Sahib Mullah" had particularly helped them in this respect as he announced to the public a manifestos in which he stated that" the constitutional government is one of the most accordable of governments with the spirit (zest) of Islam"<sup>(44)</sup>.



But the Unionists themselves did not implement what they had already stated in the constitution and ruled the country by their three accustomed mottoes of centralism, Turanism and Turkification, moreover, many Unionists were affiliated to freemasons' lodges <sup>(45)</sup>.

When the First World War erupted, the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the axis powers. As a result the Ottoman army suffered great casualties in the Iraq, Syria, and Egypt fronts whereupon the British and French forces made significant penetrations in Ottoman territories to the effect that Sultan Muhammwead Wahida'l-Din (Muhammad VI) who was given the helm after his brother's death on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July, 1918 had tumbled to the Allies' influence.

In May, 1919, the Ottoman government dispatched Mustapha Kemal to Anatolia to major general the Third Army mustered at Erdrum and Sevas. But Mustapha Kemal presided over a resistance movement hostile to the Government of Istanbul. He was able to gather supporters and called for convening of a conference in Erzerum on the 23<sup>rd</sup> July, 1919. This conference issued a declaration confirming the maintenance and integrity of Anatolia and called for national armed forces to defend it. On the 19th March 1920 A.D, the Grand National Assembly was set up and it held its first session at Ankara electing Mustapha kemal as its president <sup>(46)</sup>.



### **Secularist Politics during the Reign of Mustapha Kemal Atatürk**

When Sultan Muhammad VI resorted to religion against Mustapha Kemal and his supporters by eliciting a verdict from Sheikhu'l- Islam Duri Efendi Abdullah accusing Mustapha Kemal of heresy and calling Muslims to fight him, he retorted by eliciting a counter verdict from sheikhu'l-Islam of Ankara condemning the former verdict on the ground that it was null and void since it had been issued under foreign occupation of the country <sup>(47)</sup>. What had in fact exasperated and raged Mustapha Kemal was the Sultan's condescence to foreign occupation while fierce fully fighting at the same time any step towards European cultural advance.

This contradiction had occasioned the question Mustapha Kemal put to himself first and to his people later:” How could Turkey accept the West as an occupation and reject it as a culture? What Turkey had rather to do was the sharp opposite that is to accept the West as a culture and reject it as an occupation!”<sup>(48)</sup>

Mustapha Kemal had led the Turkish armed forces and achieved major victories in Izmir and other places, thus forcing the allied forces to enter into negotiation with Ankara. But they also invited Istanbul government to participate as well. In consequence the Grand National





Assembly held a stormy session in which representatives attacked the foreigner-ridden government of Istanbul.

On the 30<sup>th</sup> of October a draft proposal to the effect of declaration a Republic was submitted. But the Assembly did not reach an agreement on the proposal until next day, that is the First of November, 1922. when Mustapha Kemal delivered a speech in which he confirmed the possibility of separating the "Sultanate" from the "Caliphate" with the transfer of the former to the Grand National Assembly stressing that the caliphate had been terminated since Hulako's execution of the last Abbaside legitimate caliph, namely: Al-Musta'sim bi'l-Lah in 1258, and Selim I (1512-1520) when occupied Egypt in 1517, did not pay much concern to transferring the caliphate to himself from the caliph Al-Qa'im.

After Mustapha Kemal had finished his speech, the Grand National Assembly took a rather significant measure that is separating the sultanate from caliphate and stripping the "Caliph" from his temporal authority only to remain with the title of caliph<sup>(49)</sup>. The purpose of this step was clearly to send a signal to the Alliance powers that the government in Ankara could not tolerate two Turkish delegations; one from Istanbul and the other from Ankara, rather the only legitimate representative was the government of Ankara.





The signal also maintained that the Sultan in Istanbul had insulted the dignity of the Turkish nation, and that the Grand National Assembly was the only supreme authority and it had issued a decree to the effect of cancellation all the laws and decrees which the government of Istanbul had issued starting from 6 March, 1920 <sup>(50)</sup>. To add fuel to fire, the Grand National Assembly accused the Caliph Muhammad VI on the 16<sup>th</sup> March, 1922, of treason. But the Sultan ran away on board a British frigate to Malta next day. Thus, the government of Ankara remained the only legitimate authority in Turkey <sup>(51)</sup>.

On the 6<sup>th</sup> October, 1923 Kemalist forces entered Istanbul, and on the 29<sup>th</sup> October, 1923, the Grand National Assembly held a historic session culminated in the declaration of the establishment of Turkish Republic and the election of Mustapha Kemal a first president of the Republic. Ankara, henceforth, became the official capital of the Republic instead of Istanbul which harbored the memories of Ottoman Sultanate and Caliphate <sup>(52)</sup>.

The necessary steps to secularize the Turkish state were not taken until after the declaration of the Republic for Mustapha Kemal did not play down the role of the caliphate in dominating people emotions even on the day of the cancellation of the Sultanate. He was telling the Grand National Assembly about the "blessed trustworthiness" and what it might bring of welfare to the



country. He did not demand from the Assembly but an agreement to assign to both caliphate and Sultanate a definitive rank where each can be distinguished from the other as was the situation in Egypt before the Ottoman invasion with a sole difference that is while the Sultan in Egypt was a person, his counterpart in Turkey is the Grand National Assembly.

On the same time, Mustapha Kemal did not relish the prefixation of the word "Efendi" to the caliph since this word was a foreign borrowing and was, therefore, unsuitable to collocate with a word of such sublime was, therefore, unsuitable to collocate with a word of such sublime connotation. A caliph is the "Servant of the Muslims" and a "Servant of the two Holy Shrines" and as such it should be not haphazardly used. In this connection, a committee was appointed by the National Assembly session on 1<sup>st</sup> October, 1922 to offer the title of caliph to Abdul-Majeed the son of Sultan Abdul Aziz. Mustapha Kemal had accordingly forwarded a telegram to Prince Abdul-Majeed telling him that the Grand National Assembly had unanimously elected him a caliph for all Muslims and that his election was announced to all Muslims in the World <sup>(53)</sup>.

Mustapha Kemal was satisfied, at the beginning, with the distinction between the religious and the political authorities which the caliph enjoyed stripping the





political authority from the sultan while maintaining him as a caliph<sup>(54)</sup>. However, after the signing of the army, Mustapha Kemal was vehemently prepared to take the second important step. This time was for the abolishment of caliphate.

The step was amply justified since Mustapha Kemal felt that caliphate had lost its significance and grounds for existence. He also, considered the caliph as becoming a fountain-head for conspiracies and a plea for others to interfere in the internal concerns of the state of Turkey which its leadership could no more tolerate any threat that would undermine its existence. Consequently the office of caliph should only be reserved in the book of memory<sup>(55)</sup>.

For these reasons the Grand National Assembly declared the abolishment of caliphate on the 3<sup>rd</sup> March, 1924 with reference to the laws numbered 429, 430 and 431<sup>(56)</sup>. To justify this measure of caliphate cancellation, the Assembly released a message to the nation bearing the title: "Caliphate and the Authority of the Nation"<sup>(57)</sup> which emphasized that the caliph derives his authority from the nation, and that it was the nation that selects the caliph and it was the only power that possessed the right to appoint or displace him<sup>(58)</sup>.

It becomes all-too-evident that Mustapha Kemal was very much careful in all the steps he had taken, to







build up a modern Turkish state that can match up to the rank of the advanced European states. He felt that it was time for the Turks to reconsider their interest and sever their ties with the Muslim nations among whom they co-existed for many centuries.

The Grand National Assembly did not fail to remind the Turks that "Wasn't it not for the sake of the caliphate, Islam, and Muslim Ulama', that poor Turkish peasants fought and were killed for five uninterrupted centuries? It is now time for Turkey to look after its interests:" <sup>(59)</sup>.

By abolishing caliphate, Turkey had removed a barrier on its way to achieve two objectives; the first was that Western powers had begun to pursue a much more flexible line of action with Turkey and seemed ready to recognize its independence. The second was the growing confidence of Turkish state men to announce overtly their will for secularization of the Young Republic<sup>(60)</sup>.

Some observers had considered that step as an uncalculated risk initiated by Mustapha Kemal to replace Islamic thought by a secularist Western thought <sup>(61)</sup>. Seen from a wider spectrum, it was indispensable for the new Republic to harbor these changes within a framework of a new constitution and it so happened<sup>(62)</sup>.

On the 20<sup>th</sup> April, 1924 a new constitution was promulgated. It encompassed 105 articles stressing that the supreme authority belongs to people who are



represented by the Grand National Assembly" the parliament". The constitution also conferred personal freedom and the rights to believe, think and make assemblies. It also set a legal configuration for the Turkish state modeled after the liberal, Western ideal.

The constitution did not mention in its context any thing about religious authority except the article stating that "Islam is the official religion in Turkey". On the other hand, the constitution states that "no one is to be watched for his religion, faith and religion both are a concern of the heart and it was utterly permissible to hold religious celebrations and offer religious services that do not run counter to order morals or laws. Finally, the constitution states- article 26- that " implementation of fundamental Islamic laws is the duty of the Grand National Assembly" (63).

However, when Mustapha Kemal sensed the significance of a political organization in the implementation of his plans and facilitation of his task, he laid the foundations of the people's party. And on the 20<sup>th</sup> July, 1923 he drew down a programme for this party. This programme can be summarized in two points: the first is to promote Turkey up to a typical modern state, and the second to strike out any religious, sectarian, class, racial or economic difference that would undermine equity of rights and freedoms among its members<sup>(64)</sup>.





Secularism was one of the basic pillars on which the organization of Turkish state rested <sup>(65)</sup>. Official curricula dictated that both legal system and regulations were to be henceforth based on the so-called scientific mentality that harmonizes well with the fundamentals of modern culture. Religion, on the other hand, was an emotional matter and it was, accordingly, to be confined within the subjective world of the individual <sup>(66)</sup>. Anyway, secularism in Turkey did not entail that law excluded religion; it rather meant organizing it by laws. Laws respect personal beliefs of people, and the penal code of 1926 embraced an article on offences relating to freedom of belief <sup>(67)</sup>.

Thus separating religion from the state is an indispensable means for the progress of a nation. This does not mean that the state is atheistic denying the existence of God, but rather that the state did not play any religious role for two reasons: first, religious belief was not but a matter of purely subjective feelings. Second to sidestep political and social cleavages which worked in the recent past for the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire that was composed of different cultures, and religions <sup>(68)</sup>. Bernard Lewis says to this effect: "The foundation of Kemalist policy towards religion was based on Laicism and was irreligious" <sup>(69)</sup>.

It is worth mentioning in this respect that the exploitation of religion by the European powers to



interfere with Turkish affairs and previously with the Ottoman polices, was one of the reasons that encouraged Mustapha Kemal and his colleagues to head towards secularism and prove the pretext of European interference worthless<sup>(70)</sup>.

The People's Party held its first conference on 15<sup>th</sup> October, 1927 where in both programme and by-laws of the party were decided. The motto of the party which was composed of four arrows resting on four pillars representing, Republicanism, Publicism, popularism, and secularism was drawn out. The second conference of the party which was held in 1931 had added two other pillars; these were Etatism and Revolution ions. Thus, Turkey has, as 1937 constitution maintains, become public, popular, statistic, secular, and revolutionary republic<sup>(71)</sup>.

Mustapha Kemal believed that the independence of Turkey was the first step towards establishing a modern state according to secularist principles. This made him go ahead with his efforts towards full-modernization of Turkish society .He therefore ordered the implementation of a series of measures and changes that were accompanied by a soot of regimentation<sup>(72)</sup>. Those measures and changes were so extensive that they covered all aspects of Turkish life. Among these was the confirmation on educating Turkish generation according to the above-mentioned principles which cannot be





achieved without concentration on nationalistic and patriotic feelings besides the projection of linguistic, familial, and social characteristics<sup>(73)</sup>.

The next important step was the issue of Religious Reformation Law of 1924 which abolished the office of Sheikhu'l-Islam and all the legislative and judicial institutions related to him<sup>(74)</sup>. The law also abolished the Mortmain (Awqaf) ministry and transferred supervision of religious schools to the state educational administration. It had also established the Ministry of Religious Affairs and connected it to the President Office<sup>(75)</sup>.

Moreover, on the 8<sup>th</sup> April, 1924 the government ratified the law of court's constituency which abolished the religious courts and pensioned their judges off. These changes were affected on the justification that they set a barrier on the way of modernization and setting up a uniform legal system<sup>(76)</sup>.

Mustapha Kemal then waged war against religious practices and formalities. He launched a campaign against Sufi orders<sup>(77)</sup>. To this effect, he gave a speech on 30<sup>th</sup> August, 1925, in Kastomania where Mavlwi Sufi order thrived.

He said that "The Secularist Republic of Turkey could no longer tolerate Sheikhs, Dervishes and their following of the order to prosper on Turkish land". He continued:



“asking for help and assistance from the dead is nothing but a blow to civilized human society... And, if, there should be an order of any sort it was the order of civilization based on sciences. So for those who want to become humans, it is up to them to accept what civilization offers and interact with it. As for the sheikhs of the Sufi orders, they must comprehend these statements clearly and take the lead in closing down their hospices and saint lodges by their own submissive initiative or else I will knock them down upon their heads” <sup>(78)</sup>.

On his return from that city, the council of Ministers held a meeting on 1<sup>st</sup> Sep., 1925 culminated in the issue of three exclusive decrees <sup>(79)</sup>. These were:

1. The abolishment of all Sufi orders and closing down of hospices and zawaiyyas connected to them.
2. Prohibition of religious uniforms except on ulama.
3. The compulsory wearing on of hats for all state officials.

These laws were soon branched off. Ulama' were forbidden from wearing their uniform unless inside mosques <sup>(80)</sup>. Hats were enforced on the whole nation to wear <sup>(81)</sup>, while they were previously enforced on officials only <sup>(82)</sup>.

It is noticeable that while abolishing of Sufi orders, closing down of hospices, enforcing hats on men and



stripping veils from women were not very much un-Islamic, the Kemalists found in them necessary procedures to complement their secularist measures <sup>(83)</sup>. Consequently, some intellectuals and religions figures tried to resist those secularist measures and they deemed it as a departure from Islam. But Mustapha Kemal was on the alert so he introduced into the penal code an article that prevents the employment of religion for political ends. It runs as follows:

"Those who instigate the general public to do actions that undermine state security under the mask of religion or urge them into disobedience of secularist laws and regulations under pretext that secularism sacrileges religions beliefs and institutions are subject to punishment according to official laws. Also, organizing a political party based on religious instructions is punishable by law" <sup>(84)</sup>.

Articles 241, 242, and 259 have also stated that religious officials including muftis, preachers, orators and prayer-leaders who disregard application of state's laws and regulations or who instigate people not to obey laws and regulations are subject to punishment. They have also stated that every one who stages a religions celebration outside places of worship is subject to punishment <sup>(85)</sup>.

On 6<sup>th</sup> October 1926, the state had adopted a number of Swiss and Italian penal laws to replace a series of laws





known then as the gazette of Shari'ah laws <sup>(86)</sup>. Thus a new penal law based on an Italian counterpart was issued. A civil law for marriage was also issued. This law forbade polygamy. With the ratification of the new civil law by the Grand National Assembly, it was indispensable to review all subjective laws according to the principles of the secular policy of the state <sup>(87)</sup>.

It is worth-bearing in mind that all these secularist laws had been promulgated in Turkey while the constitution there was still holding that "Islam is the official religion of the state" and that "the implementation of the provisions of Islamic laws (Ahkamu'l-Shariah) lies within the responsibility of the Grand National Assembly" <sup>(88)</sup>. Therefore, a number of deputies of the People's Party took the initiative and presented on the 20<sup>th</sup> April, 1928, a proposal to the Grand National Assembly demanding the Assembly to consider agreement on the rectification of the constitution.

On the selfsame day the Assembly agreed on the proposal and affected the rectification demanded. These rectifications were not in essence, but the cancellation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> article which states that "Islam is the official religion of the state in Turkey" <sup>(89)</sup>. However, Turkey was still to wait some other decade for the statement that "Turkey is a secular state" to appear in the constitution of 1937<sup>(90)</sup>. This seemed only possible when Mustapha





Kemal himself forced his utter control on the Assembly, thus reducing the ratio of religious representatives from the significant percentage of %21 to less than %1 only <sup>(91)</sup>.

Kemalists carried on their efforts towards modernization of Turkish society. They decided to adopt the Western calendar, numerical systems and holidays and the Assembly did not hesitate a moment in ratifying such decisions in 1926. Among these novelties the Kemalists introduced were the introduction of Christian calendar to replace the Islamic counterpart <sup>(92)</sup>, the initiation of the process of purification of Turkish language to the effect of dropping out Persian and Arabic borrowings from it on 3<sup>rd</sup> Nov., 1928, and the application, on the largest possible scale of Latin alphabet to replace the Arabic alphabet which was widely used during the Ottoman period <sup>(93)</sup>.

The oath of honor of both the president of the Republic and of the representative in the GNA was altered in 1928. Thus, striking out the word "Allah" and replace it with the word "honour" <sup>(94)</sup>. Call for prayer was dropped out and instead of "Allahu'Akbar" (God is Great) the phrase (Tanri uludir) reechoed in Turkey's skies. The Qur'an itself was translated into Turkish language and a Turkish comment of the Qur'an was soon in circulation <sup>(95)</sup>.

The committee in charge of deleting certain textbooks from the curricula such as history within the corpus of

Islamic law ridiculed such topics on the justification that such and such topics were laid down to respond to life in Arabia fourteen centuries ago. They also ridiculed the prejudices of religious bigots describing them as both pontifications and primitive soothsaying. The committee finally, stressed that Swiss law was being more suitable for the new Turkish society and much more satisfying to its needs <sup>(96)</sup>.

The kemalists adopted new procedures and promulgated new laws to enforce secularism on Turkey during the period 1928-1938. Among those new measures was the promulgation of new laws regarding the status of women, making women on equal footing with men and giving them their right to take part in political, social, and cultural life in Turkey <sup>(97)</sup>.

In 1931-32; the government went further as to cut down the number of mosques and the number of preachers to 300 to be paid by the state. They were required not to exclude the speeches they give on Fridays to religious topic only but also to include matters relating to economic and social life. The government then closed down two of Turkey's most famous mosques; "Aiya Sofia" which was transformed into a museum, and "Al-Fatih Mosque" to be transformed into a deposit <sup>(98)</sup>.

On 29<sup>th</sup> Oct, the government issued a decree to the effect of introducing a family surname. A novelty





unknown during the Ottoman period. The government also ordered the revoke of old titles such as Pasa, Peg, Efendi, Jilibi, Khanim indicating certain social ranks and replaced them by family surnames and honorific Mr. and Mrs<sup>(99)</sup>.

In the elections of spring 1935 seventeen women entered the GNA, and in June, 1935 weekend holiday was changed so as to begin from Saturday afternoon till Monday morning just like Europe making Friday which has a particular holiness for Muslims an ordinary day. The justification the press provided for that is that European weekend is much more fitting and practical for commercial transactions, and business administration of such major institutions as the government, banks companies and fiscal and financial bodies that were related to Europe<sup>(100)</sup>.

Freemason lodges welcomed those secularist trends in Turkey<sup>(101)</sup>. They considered their success a triumph for Freemasonry. This had become euphoria especially when the People's Party had adopted secularism in its programme.

Accordingly, Freemason lodges decided to close down and leave out their furniture and belongings to public Houses which the People's Party had established with the aim of promoting the secularist spirit in Turkey<sup>(102)</sup>. A scholar has commented on that saying: "International

Freemasonry was able to achieve some of its objectives by making Turkey sever its connection to both its past and its Islamic environment”<sup>(103)</sup>.

### Conclusions

Mustapha Kemal Atatürk had tried transforming Turkey into a European state and severing it from both its Muslim past and Ottoman Empire. Turkish middle class whose interests were interlaced with the West had supported him in all the measures he adopted. This it did to fulfill two objectives: first to undermine the economic and social foundations of traditional Ottoman classes such as the notables and religious groups as well as their Islamic ideology, and second; to work for the establishment of a new political and economic structure based on Western prototypes and armed with the weapon of secularism.

However, one is bound to ask whether the Kemalists had succeeded in their mission and given the Turks a new identity? And if secularist trends had found a response in the very depth of Turkish people's psychology. To answer those questions we have to say that Turkey is still facing social, economic, and political problems which reveal that the changes the Kemalists affected in society were no more but an imitation of formal and surface aspects of Western systems, laws and institutions. This did not





move the enthusiasm of the greater majority of common people-particularly in the countryside that only fell short from active resistance to these changes. A consequence which made Atatürk's successors realize that it was impossible to ignore a rather significant reality that religion is one of the most political and social forces influencing Turkish society.





### Notes & References

1. On this topic see, for instance: Weiker, Walter, F. The Modernization of Turkey from Atatürk to the present Day. New York, 1981, p. 105.
2. After severe defeats the Ottoman armies suffered as in the battle of carlofitz 1699 , and the loss of vast territories, the Ottoman state implemented a wide range reformation movement which encompassed its military economic, social, and administrative systems. That reformation movement received a new momentum up on the promulgation of Tanzimat in 1839 This movement gave rise to a conflict between the conservatives and reformists which dragged on for the 18<sup>th</sup> and the 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Common people did not take part and were not concerned with these developments which were reserved for the enlightened elite and a pact of politicians. See Weiker, Ibid, p. 105. Also, Khalid Ziyyada. Discovery of European Progress: A study of European Impact on the Ottomans during the 18<sup>th</sup> Century. (in Arabic) Beiruth, 1981, p-8ff.
3. "Secularism" denotes the separation of religion from the state. This term emerged in Europe since the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Another term that gained currency in Turkey after the crystallization of its secularist tendencies; that is "Laicism" GK: Laikos which applies to ordinary man of the street as



- distinguished from the clergy. Both terms were used to signify separation of the religion from the state. See Berkes, Niyazi. The Development of Secularism in Turkey. Montreal, 1964, p.5.
4. On this thought and the factors of the rise of Ottoman Empire see kiperte, Fu'ad. History of the Ottoman Empire. Beirut, 1977; Shannawi, Abdul-Aziz. The Ottoman state: A Wronged Islamic state. Two volumes, Cairo, 1978; and Famhat M.N. "Methodological Notes re. The Evaluation of Ottoman Empire". Al- Hilal, Cairo, No. 7, 1986, p.74.
  6. The Arab intellectual Satic'l- Hisri was one of the first who took the lead impugn the idea of caliphate transfer to the Ottomans; see' Al-Hisri, Satic. Arab countries and the Ottoman State. Beirut, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 1965. Asad Rustum had also impugned this idea in his book Opinions and Research works. Beirut, 1967, pp.16-19. See also Ahmad, Ibrahim Khalil "The History of Arab Homeland during the Ottoman Epoch". Mosul, Dar'l-Kutub lil-Tiba'a wa'l-Nashr, 1983, pp.62-66., wherein a reference is made that the first to mention the resignation episode was the French historian Dowson in his book; "A General View of the Ottoman Empire" without providing his reference.
  7. Heper, Metin. "Islam, polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective". The Middle East Journal, No.3; 1981, p.347.



8. The verdicts covering the period 1922-1924 including the collection of Fatawi "Verdicts" of Ali Efendi'l-Fu'adiyya are available at the disposal of researchers, see Farahat, Ibid., p.76.
9. Heper, Ibid., p.349.
10. For details on both sides' points of view see Ahmad, Ibid., pp. 178-179.
11. Quriceli Doci Beg submitted a report to Sultan Murad IV in 1630 where in he reviewed causes of the dedine laying the charge for that on the clergy stressing that they had adopted a lenient attitudes towards shari'ah matters. See Qoci Beg Risalasi, Istanbul; Also, Ziyada, Ibid, pp. 19-24.; Ali, Shakir Ali. Iraq's History during the Ottoman period- 1638-1750 Baghdad, 1985, p.42.
12. Ahmad, I. Kh. ,Ibid., p., P. 179.
13. Ibid., p. 179.
14. He is one of the first pioneers who wrote on secularism in Turkey, its coming into existence and development; see his above quoted book, p.23.
15. Ziyada. Ibid., p.119.
16. The reign of Sultan Ahmad III was known as the Tulip era. A period that witnessed the wide spread of cultivation of this flower which had become the symbol of flowering of poetry and literature in the Ottoman Empire-See Ziyada. Ibid., p.120.
17. Ibid., p.39.
18. Ibid., p.43.
19. Ibid., pp.45-47.





20. Ibid., p.47.
21. Ahmad., Ibid., pp.180-181.
22. Ibid., p.181
23. For details on Sultan Mahmud II programme of reformation; See: Al-Bahrawi, Muhammad Abdul-Latif. The Movement of Ottoman Reformation during the Reign of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Sultan 1808-1839 Cairo, 1978.
24. Ahmad., Ibid., pp. 189-190.
25. Ibid., p. 189.
26. Ibid., p. 189.
27. Lewis, Geoffrey. Modern Turkey. London, 1974, p.43.
28. Ibid., p.43.
29. Some observers give a later date than 1876 for the continuation of Ottoman reformation movement, and consider the reforms introduced by Mustapha Kemal as an off-shoot to Ottoman reforms. See Jiha, Shafiq. "Tanzimat or the Reformation Movement in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1877 " Majalatu' l-Abhath, Beirut, 18<sup>th</sup> year, Part 2, June 1965, p.108.
30. Ad. Duri, Abdul-Aziz. Historical Genesis of Arab Nation: A study of Identity and Consciousness. Beirut, 1984, p.132.
31. For details on educational reforms, see. Ahmad, Ibrahim Khalil. The Evolution of National Education in Iraq 1869-1932 Baghdad, 1982, p.30.
32. Berkes., Ibid., p. 30.



33. Ahmad I KH. History of Arab Homeland during the Ottoman Epoch. pp. 196-197.
34. For details see Gokalp, Ziya. Turkish Nationalism & Western Civilization. New York, 1959, p. 269.
35. Ahmad., Ibid., pp. 210-211.
36. Ibid., p. 211.
37. Ibid., p. 210.
38. See Al-Bustani, Suleiman. A Reconsideration & Memory of The Ottoman State before and after the constitution. Recension & study by Ziyada, Khalid. Beirut, 1978, p. 160.
39. Ahmad., Ibid., p.211.
40. Ibid., pp. 212-213.
41. Barakat, Ahmad Fahd, Shawabka. The Movement of Pan -Islamism from the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to 1909 Amman, 1978 which is generally regarded as one of the best studies on this topic.
42. For details on the emergence of Union and Progress Committee see Ramrose, Ernest. The Young Turkey and the 1908 Revolution tr. by Salih Ahmad Al-Ali. Beirut, 1960.
43. For details on this movement known as Reactionism; see Tal'at, Fu'ad. 31-Mart Irtija'. Istanbul, 1327 A.H., pp. 2-3.
44. Suleiman, Ahmad Al-Said. Religious and Nationalist Trends in contemporary Turkey. Cairo, pp.41-42.
45. Ramrose., Ibid., p. 127.



46. Karl-Brochermann. History of Islamic Nations. Dr Nabih Amin Faris & Munir Ba'labaki. Fifth Impression, Beirut, 1968, p. 688
47. Al-Zein, Mustapha. Atatürk and his Successors. Beirut, 1982, p.276.
48. Ibid., p. 277.
49. For details see Mustapha Kamal Atatürk. A speech. Istanbul, 1963, p. 576.
50. Azzo, Hanna Behnan. Political Developments in Turkey 1919-1923 Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, College of Arts, Baghdad University, 1989, p.118.
51. Lowe, Norman. Mastering Modern World History. Hong-Kong, 1982, p. 118.
52. Abdul-Rahim Mustapha, Ahmad. On the Origins of Ottoman History. Beirut, Daru'I-Shuruq 1982, p. 312.
53. Suleiman., Ibid., p. 61.
54. Abu Nasr, Omer, " 20 Years after the War 1918-1938". Al-Majala, No. 3. Damascus, 1939, p. 29.
55. Ghafoor, Abdul-Jabbar Qadir. "Religion and Sufi orders". A chapter in Contemporary Turkey by Ahmad et al. Mosul, 1988, p. 92.
56. Brochermann., Ibid., p. 696.
57. Mansur, Faruq. " Islam and the Foundation of Government". Majalat Al-Mawrid, Baghdad, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1983, pp 246- 247.
58. Abdul-Razaq, Ali. Islam and the Origins of Government. Damascus, without date, p. 230.



59. Armstrong, Hess. *The Gray Wolf: Mustapha Kemal. Cairo* without date, p. 198.
60. Soylemez, Yuksel. "Turkey: Western on Moslem". *Turkish Review-Quarterly, Digest. Autumn, 1992*, p. 50. It is worth – mentioning that some Turks raised the slogan (Sharq Wada') "Goodbye East"! See in this connection, Shakir, Amin et al. *Turkey and Arab policy. Cairo*, without date, p. 104.
61. Lewis, Geoffrey. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
62. Some researchers consider Tanzimat as a West-oriented movement whose purpose was to pacify Europe and lure it into a much more flexible and sympathetic behavior towards the Ottoman Empire. The Tanzimat were also viewed as a viaduct over which the state would pass leaving its Levantine Islamism to the occidental secularism. See Abdul-Hamid, Muhammad Harb. "The Distinctive Features of the Historical, and Ideological Foundations of Safety party in Turkey". In *the Educational Beaureau for Arab Gulf States-a Forum on Trends in contemporary Muslim Thought. Bahrain 22-25 Feb., 1985*, p. 440. Likewise, another researcher sees that the price Turkey paid for its independence was the severance of its ties with the East and Islam and that Mustapha Kemal was only able to restore Turkish sovereignty over its territories at the expense of compliance with Western conditions, see Mustapha Nabil "The



- Evaluation of Ottoman State "Majalat al-Hilal, Cairo, Year 93, No. 12, Dec., 1985, p. 42.
63. Soylemez., Ibid., p. 50.
64. For details on the making of the People's Party see Ahmad, I. Kh. "Political parties in Turkey" – A chapter in contemporary Turkey by Ahmad, I. Khalil et al., Dar Al-Kutub lil Tibaa wal Nashr, Mosul University, Mosul, 1988, pp. 157-164.
65. For details see: Darwaza, Muhammad Izzu. Modern Turkey. Beiruth, 1946.
66. Weiker., Ibid., p. 105.
67. Soylemez., Ibid., p. 51.
68. Al-Jumaili, Qasim Khalaf 'Asi. Developments and Trends in Internal Turkish Policy 1923-1928 Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, College of Arts, Baghdad University 1985, p. 202.
69. Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 406.
70. Al-Jumaili., Ibid., p. 203.
71. For details see Ahmad I.Kh and Murad, Kh. Ali. Iran and Turkey: A study of modern and contemporary history. Mosul, 1992, p. 245.
72. Hourani, Albert. The Emergence of the Modern Middle East. Oxford, 1981, p.189. In this connection Soylemez call those laws "Draconian Laws). See Soylemez, Ibid., p. 50.
73. Darawaza., Ibid., pp. 160-168.
74. Al-Zein., Ibid., p. 280.



75. Mustapha., Ibid., p. 314.
76. Soylemez., Ibid., p. 50.
77. Ottoman Empire was a meeting-ground for several Sufi orders. Some of these orders such as Bektashi, Mavlawi, Qadiri, and Naqshabindi had played a significant role in social and political life. See Ghafoor., Ibid., pp. 89-92.
78. Al-Zein., Ibid., p. 279.
79. Suleiman., Ibid., p.64.
80. Suleiman., Ibid., p.64.
81. One of the ironies that call our attention is that Sultan Mahmud II had ordered the wearing of "Tarbush" as a symbol of modernization to replace traditional Muslim headgear. However, Mustapha Kemal after the lapse of a century ordered the wearing of a hat to stand for modernization and the West to replace the "Tarbush" which became a symbol for traditional reactionary. See Al-Jamil, Sayyar kawkab. "Impacts of Modernization in Contemporary Turkish Society" In: The First Conference of Turkish Studies, Mosul University, June, 1989, p. 18.
82. Al-Ni'aymi., Ibid., p. 38
83. Suleiman., Ibid., p. 65.
84. Al-Zein., Ibid., p. 279.
85. Ibid., p. 280.
86. James, A. Bill and Carl Leiden. The Middle East and Power. Toronto, 1977, p. 43.



87. Shaw, Stanford J. And Shaw, E. K. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol II., Cambridge, 1977, p. 385.
88. It is worth-mentioning that the writer Halide Edib had criticized the statement that "Islam is the official religion in Turkey" and demanded its deletion from the constitution, see Halide Edib. Turkey Focus West. New York, 1930, p. 214.
89. Suleiman., Ibid., p. 65.
90. Soylemez., Ibid., p.50.
91. For details see Frey, Frederick W. The Turkish Political Elite. New York, 1965, pp. 59-60. Also, Al-Jawahiri, Imad Ahmad "Atatürk Principles and Political Activity in Turkey 1923-1960 ". Dirasat Arabiyya, Year 18, No. 8-12, June-Oct., 1982, p.100.
92. Mustapha., Ibid., p. 315.
93. For details on linguistic reformation and the activities of Turkish Language Society founded in 1926. See Shaw and Shaw., Ibid., p. 376.
94. Suleiman., Ibid., p. 68.
95. Ibid., p. 69.
96. Ibid., p. 63.
97. Mustapha., Ibid., p. 316.
98. Ibid., p. 317.
99. Ibid., p. 317.
100. Al-Jamil., Ibid., p. 20.



101. For details on freemasonry, see the invaluable study: Soysal, Ilhan. *Turkiya ve Dunyada Masonluk ve Masonlar*. Istanbul, 1978.
102. Royal Iraqi Consulate Report for May 1937 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No 7/8/15 on 17<sup>th</sup> June, 1937. A zerox copy of which is kept in the archives of the Regional Studies Center, Mosul University, Mosul, Iraq.
103. Some researchers have pointed out that Mustafa Kemal belonged to Dunama Jews and that he was affiliated to a Freemasons' lodge. See zaloom, Abdul-Qayyim. "How the Caliphate was Taken down?", without date, p. 190; and Al- 'Irfan, Fathi Abdul-Rahman. *Thus They Intrigued against Islam and Forged History*. Amman, 1990, p.70. Also, A British Document en: "Was Kemal Atatürk a Jew?" In: *Majalat al Arab*, London, 17 May, 1989.

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## ال جذور التاريخية للعلمانية في تركيا المعاصرة

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